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BEYOND COMPENSATION:
USING TORTS TO PROMOTE
PUBLIC HEALTH
ELIZABETH A. WEEKS*
This article began as my comments for a panel on Public Health in Law, at
the 2006 Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, co-sponsored by
the Sections on Law, Medicine and Health Care; Socio-Economics; and Torts and
Compensation Systems. Our panel was charged with the task of suggesting
methods and approaches to incorporating public health themes into traditional law
school courses, namely: Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Health Law,
Contracts, and Torts. My co-panelists, whose articles also appear in this issue,
covered the first four of these topics, and I was asked to address the fifth: Public
Health in Torts. At my institution, I teach Torts and also have the luxury of
teaching an entire dedicated seminar on Public Health Law. Recent headlines-
Hurricane Katrina, Avian Flu, Vioxx-amply demonstrate the importance of
teaching public health and piquing students' interests on pressing areas of public
concern. Therefore, these articles are particularly timely and provide guidance for
teaching public health law in both traditional law school courses and expanded
specialty curriculum.'
Among the substantive law school courses through which the panel suggested
addressing public health themes, Torts is arguably the poorest fit and least intuitive.
Copyright Q 2007 by Elizabeth A. Weeks.
* Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law (Lawrence, KS). This article is adapted from
the author's lecture at the Association of American Law Schools' Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.,
Empirical Scholarship: What Should We Study and How Should We Study It?, which was co-sponsored
by the AALS Sections on Law, Medicine and Health Care; Socio-Economics; and Torts and
Compensation Systems, entitled Public Health in Law (January 2006). The author acknowledges
Professor Larry Levine, University of the Pacific-McGeorge School of Law, for allowing her to fill his
place, but certainly not his shoes, on this panel. Anne Bloom, Assistant Professor, University of the
Pacific-McGeorge School of Law, and Gary Gwilliam of Gwilliam, Ivary, Chiosso, Cavalli & Brewer,
Oakland, CA, provided substantial insight to the discussion in Section V, for which the author is
grateful. Great appreciation also goes to Michael Wells for teaching me Torts and reading a draft of this
article.
1. See also Wendy E. Parmet & Anthony Robbins, Public Health Literacy for Lawyers, 31 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 701, 701 (2003) (discussing the increasing importance of public health in society and
legal practice and urging development of law school curriculum focused on public health concerns).
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Edward Richards, in his article, will suggest that Administrative Law is public
health law; they are one and the same, unavoidably coterminous.2 At the opposite
end of the spectrum, it is initially difficult to see the overlap of torts and public
health. A narrow view of tort law suggests that the principal goal is compensation:
to make the victim whole-to return him, as close as possible, to the position he
would have occupied but for the injury. That objective is accomplished through
civil litigation and the return of a verdict ordering the defendant-tortfeasor to pay a
sum of money to the plaintiff-victim as damages.3 Some view the substantive,
procedural, and evidentiary rules of tort litigation as directed toward the singular
goal of facilitating the tort victim's recovery. Any ancillary policy objectives are
secondary, at best. That perception of tort law comports with the general public's
pejorative view of shyster personal injury, or "ambulance-chasing," lawyers.4 How
can a system geared so heavily toward individual compensation comport with
broad communitarian objectives essential to public health? How can serving the
interest of individual compensation serve the greater good of society?
2. Edward P. Richards, Public Health Law as Administrative Law: Example Lessons, 10 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 61, 61-63, 88 (2007).
3. See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv. 1093, 1114
(1996) (noting that "juries are instructed to award damages to make victims 'whole,' but both the
wholeness of victims and the means to make them whole have been changing" as salaries, life
expectancies, and range and cost of medical and rehabilitative services increase).
4. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars: Doctors. Teachers. Coaches. Ministers.
They All Share a Common Fear: Being Sued on the Job. Our Litigation Nation-and a Plan to Fix It,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 42 ("Americans will sue each other at the slightest provocation ....
Many of these cases do not belong in court. But clients and lawyers sue anyways, because they hope
they will get lucky and win a jackpot .... "); Krysten Crawford, New Worry for Vioxx Victims-Scams,
CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 1, 2004,
http://money.cnn.com/2004/12/01/news/fortune5OO/vioxxads/index.htm; Power of Attorneys, Stupid
Lawsuits and Other Funny Stuff, http://www.power-of-attomeys.com/StupidLawsuit.htm (last visited
Nov. 26, 2006) (cataloguing "stupid" lawsuits and warning labels and noting that they represent just a
fraction because "[t]here are just too many crackpot lawyers and lame brain clients to keep up with all
the stupid lawsuits in America"); see also Galanter, supra note 3, at 1094-96 (describing examples of the
public's "widespread discontent with the tort system" and the perception that the system is "demented,
with freakish punitive damage bonanzas for persons who pour coffee on themselves or ricochet golf
balls into their own foreheads"). But see id. at 1099-1104 (describing objections and public perceptions
with alternative data and information about the tort system); Jon Greenbaum, McDonald's Hot Coffee
Lawsuit and Beyond: The Tort Reform Myth Machine, COMMON DREAMS NEWSCENTER, Jan. 22, 2005,
http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0122-1 .htm; Neil deMause, Trial by Anecdote: Newsweek's
"Lawsuit Explosion" Blown Away by Facts, EXTRA!, Mar./Apr. 2004,
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=l 174 (pointing out factual errors and misleading conclusions in the
Newsweek story, supra, and claiming that "tort lawsuits are in fact not on the rise"); Stephanie
Mencimer, False Alarm: How the Media Helps the Insurance Industry and the GOP Promote the Myth
of America's "Lawsuit Crisis, " WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 2004, at 18, available at
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0410.mencimer.html (noting the absence of relevant
facts in Newsweek's article, supra, and explaining that many of the most colorful examples are false
Intemet and urban legends); Anthony J. Sebok, Should Doctors Vote Against John Edwards?: Critiques
of Senator's Medical Malpractice Litigation Record Are Wrong, CNN.cOM, Jul. 27, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/27/sebok.edwards/index.html (suggesting that medical professionals
should not direct their frustration with the tort system toward tort lawyers, who are mere "participant[s]
in the system").
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I. TORTS POLICIES: COMPENSATION AND BEYOND
I emphasize on the first day of a first-semester Torts class that many
different, and often competing, policy objectives animate the law. As a
predominately common law course that lacks a rules book, uniform code, or
statutory supplement, first-year students often struggle to reconcile divergent views
and irreconcilable rules in different jurisdictions. They want answers; they want to
know what the law is. 5 Policies, and the degree to which one court or jurisdiction
values certain policy objectives more than others in any given case or area of law,
explain or offer ways to reconcile the divergent approaches. Thus, policy
arguments are central to teaching and understanding torts. Many torts policies
advance public health objectives.
Beyond compensation, making the injurer pay for the harm caused creates
incentives for safety and deters future, dangerous conduct. A damage award
ensures that the injurer "feels," or internalizes, the whole harm caused. For
example, the collateral source rule requires a defendant to pay full damages even
when the plaintiff has an alternative, or collateral, source of payment, such as
medical or life insurance, or pension or disability coverage to replace lost wages.
6
Although the collateral source rule seems to provide double-recovery to injured
plaintiffs, it is justified in the interest of avoiding a windfall to defendants from the
plaintiffs thrift and good planning.7 The rule ensures that defendants get the
correct message about acceptable conduct in the future. 8 In reality, plaintiffs
typically do not get double recovery because their tort awards are subrogated to the
insurer, which already compensated the loss. 9
Operating with accurate information, actors can make a rational cost-benefit
calculus regarding whether the potential tort damages outweigh the expected
5. "Not having a right answer to write down in your notes can be extremely frustrating. First-year
American law students have the same complaint. They, too, want certainty. They learn that they cannot
have it. The better the law school, the less certainty, and the more students have to think for
themselves." GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE
BASICS 10 (2005).
6. E.g., Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 63 (Cal. 1970).
7. E.g., id. at 66 ("The collateral source rule as applied here embodies the venerable concept that a
person who has invested years of insurance premiums to assure his medical care should receive the
benefits of his thrift. The tortfeasor should not gamer the benefits of his victim's providence." (footnote
omitted)); Arambula v. Wells, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 586 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) ("The idea [of the
collateral source rule] is that tortfeasors should not recover a windfall from the thrift and foresight of
persons who have actually or constructively secured insurance, pension or disability benefits to provide
for themselves and their families. A contrary rule, it is feared, would misallocate liability for tort-caused
losses and discourage people from obtaining benefits from independent collateral sources.").
8. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 219 (5th ed. Aspen 1998) (explaining
the underdeterrence rationale with this example: "The economic cost of the accident, however defrayed,
is $10,000, and if the judgment against him is zero, his incentive to spend up to $10,000 (discounted by
the probability of occurrence) to prevent a similar accident in the future will be reduced.").
9. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 380 (2000) (suggesting that "overcompensation is
often more theoretical than real" because of insurer's subrogation rights).
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benefits derived from the wrongful conduct.'0 Accordingly, another central
objective of tort law is utilitarian-specifically, to avoid creating too much safety.
The system does not attempt to achieve perfect safety at the expense of other
important social values." This utilitarian objective means that some dangerous,
even injurious, conduct is tolerated and will not give rise to tort liability because
the benefits to society outweigh the harm inflicted on the individual plaintiff.'
2
Tort judgments also operate as a form of loss-spreading or insurance, which
serves both efficiency and fairness policies. Rather than leaving the innocent,
injured party bearing the whole loss of accidental injuries, the tort system places
the loss on the injurer, who may be best able to spread the cost of accidents across
all of society. For example, requiring a product manufacturer, rather than an injured
consumer, to bear the cost of injury caused by the product allocates the loss to the
party in the better position to reduce the risk of injury. Product manufacturers have
better information about dangerous products and better means to address the
problem than consumers. Product manufacturers or sellers of products can also
spread the loss across society through increased purchase prices for products, or
pass on the costs to others in the distribution chain. As consumers, we pay slightly
higher prices for products, putting in our "two-cents" for the inevitable, occasional
injury while still enjoying the benefits of an otherwise desirable product.' 3
Moreover, as a matter of fairness between an innocent consumer and the
10. See Marshall S. Shapo, Responsibility for Injuries: Some Sketches, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 481,
481-82 (2006) (discussing the cost-benefit test and other economic conceptions of tort liability).
11. Marshall S. Shapo, Towards a Jurisprudence of Injury: The Continuing Creation of a
Substantive Justice in American Tort Law: Report to the American Bar Association, 1984 A.B.A. SEC.
TORT LIABILITY SYS. 4-13 (noting that under economic views of accidents, "it would be uneconomic if
too few accidents occurred" and that a judge-made rule calling for near-perfect safety "would represent
a choice by courts that goes beyond the level of safety that consumers prefer").
12. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071-72 (4th Cir. 1974) ("The
purposes and intended use of the article is an even more important factor to be considered [including,
among other factors, safety]. After all, it is a commonplace that utility of design and attractiveness of the
style of the car are elements which car manufacturers seek after and by which buyers are influenced in
their selections." (footnote omitted)); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29,
32 (1972) ("If the cost of safety measures.., exceeds the benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by
incurring that cost, society would be better off, in economic terms, to forgo accident prevention.");
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 537, 563 (1972) (defining
standard of care as "straightforward utilitarian comparison of the benefits and costs of the defendant's
risk-creating activity"); id. at 566-67 (discussing foundation of negligence principle as "exempting
socially useful risks from tort liability"); cf Shapo, supra note 10, at 482-83 (noting that efficiency-
oriented models "do not consider the fairness or morality of placing a loss on one party or the other").
13. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) ("The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to
the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business."); Jerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably Unsafe
Product and Strict Liability, 72 TENN. L. REV. 833, 838 (2005) ("[M]any believe that consumers who
benefit from products without suffering harm should share, through increases in prices charged for those
products, the burden of unavoidable injury costs that result from manufacturing defects.").
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manufacturer who created the harmful product and benefits from its sale, it seems
fair that the product manufacturer should bear the Ioss.14
Related to the deterrence function, tort law, in some cases, seeks to punish
wrongdoers. Tort plaintiffs may be awarded damages that bear no relation to the
value of the loss experienced. 15 Punitive, or exemplary, damages are available in
exceptional cases if the defendant's conduct is particularly egregious or
reprehensible.' 6 Even without punitive damages, tort judgments serve an expressive
function, communicating society's disapproval of certain conduct through the
verdict and award of damages. 7 The communicative purpose of tort law is
particularly salient in professional malpractice and defamation cases, in which
litigants' reputations are at stake.
Admittedly, many tort law principles are individualistic. 18 The law protects
personal autonomy and dignity, even in the absence of appreciable harm or
condemnable wrongdoing. Intentional torts, such as battery, assault, trespass, and
false imprisonment, may be committed even when a plaintiff experiences no harm
14. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring) ("If such products nevertheless find their
way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may
cause upon the manufacturer."); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 735 (7th ed.
2000) (discussing the "corrective justice" theory of products liability, according to which "loss should
be placed upon the party who created the condition, not the party who suffered from it"); Shapo, supra
note 10, at 483 (describing the basic notion of loss and risk spreading as "where many benefit from an
activity that injures a few, the cost of those injuries should be imposed on those advantaged by that
activity"); Phillips, supra note 13, at 838 ("'As between [product wholesalers and retailers] and innocent
victims who suffer harm because of defective products, the product sellers as business entities are in a
better position than are individual users and consumers to insure against such losses."' (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a, at 13-14 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1995))).
15. See Richard A. Nagareda, Punitive Damage Class Actions and the Baseline of Tort, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 943, 949 (2001) (noting that "punitive damages routinely violate the allocation principle
'to each, her own,"' and that "an individual plaintiff enjoys no entitlement to punitive damages, in
contrast to compensatory relief' (footnote omitted)).
16. E.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (providing
that punitive damages are "quasi-criminal" in nature and "operate as 'private fines' intended to punish
the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing" (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19
(1991))); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) ("Punitive damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others."); DOBBS, supra note 9, § 381 ("Punitive (or 'exemplary') damages.
. . are usually available only when the tortfeasor has committed quite serious misconduct with a bad
intent or bad state of mind such as malice.").
17. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42
AM. U. L. REv. 1393, 1437-38 (1993) (discussing examples of punitive damages awards as retribution
and an expression of societal disapproval); Edward L. Rubin, Punitive Damages: Reconceptualizing the
Runcible Remedies of Common Law, 1998 WISC. L. REV. 131, 138-39 (discussing various functions of
punitive damages, including "expressing moral disapproval"); see also Haslip, 499 U.S. at 54
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[P]unitive damages are specifically designed to exact punishment in excess
of actual harm to make clear that the defendant's misconduct was especially reprehensible.").
18. See Sebok, supra note 4 ("American tort law is more individualistic than any other Western
nation .... But [doctors] should not hate John Edwards for applying to his clients' cases the values
which are at the foundation of American tort law.").
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or discomfort but merely intentional "invasion" of her interest in bodily integrity.
For example, battery requires an intent to touch or bring about an unwanted
touching, not an intent to harm or injure.19 Assault does not require any touching at
all, not even fear of touching, but merely apprehension or awareness that an
unwanted touching could occur.20 A trespass may be committed even when the
defendant honestly but mistakenly believes he has a right to be on the plaintiffs
land,2' or when the defendant emits microscopic particles that unavoidably migrate
onto the plaintiff s land.22
Other torts rules protect freedom of action, allowing a sphere of activity and
room for mistakes, even harm-producing mistakes, for which defendants will not be
liable. Most significantly, by moving away from certain key elements of our British
common law origins, the United States shifted from a strict liability standard for
accidental injury to a negligence, or fault-based, standard.23 Negligence allows
defendants to make mistakes and even cause harm; defendants avoid liability as
long as their conduct is reasonable in the view of the fact-finder.24
19. E.g., Vitale v. Henchey, 24 S.W.3d 651, 657-58 (Ky. 2000) ("The intent necessary for battery
'is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm.' Rather, it is an intent to make contact
with the person, not the intent to cause harm."); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627,
629 (Tex. 1967) (finding battery when plaintiff, a black mathematician attending a meeting at an all-
white country club, had plate snatched from his hand by a white waiter because "[t]he intentional
snatching of an object from one's hand is as clearly an offensive invasion of his person as would be an
actual contact with the body"); Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Wash. 1955) (finding a battery
would exist if, when a child pulled a lawn chair out from under a woman causing her to have contact
with the ground, that child "knew with substantial certainty that the [woman] would attempt to sit down
where the chair had been").
20. See, e.g., Beach v. Hancock, 27 N.H. 223, 223-24, 230 (1853) (recognizing assault where
defendant threateningly waved a gun, which, unbeknownst to plaintiff, was not loaded); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 21(1)(a) (1965) (defining assault as "intending to cause a harmful or offensive
contact.., or an imminent apprehension of such a contact").
21. See, e.g., S. Counties Ice Co. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 157, 159 (S.D. Cal.
1941) (finding that studio employees committed trespass and harmed property while mistakenly
believing they had a right to enter to erect a set); Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 267 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan.
1954) (finding landowner liable in trespass for trimming neighbor's trees that she mistakenly believed
were on her property).
22. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 797 (Or. 1959) (recognizing trespass as
interference with a possessor's "proprietary or dignitary interest" in land, which may "be violated by a
ray of light, by an atomic particle, or by a particulate of fluoride").
23. Compare Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 485-87 (1873) (denying liability when non-
negligently maintained steam boiler exploded, sending projectile metal shards onto neighbor's property)
with Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (finding liability when non-negligently
constructed water reservoir broke through and flooded neighbor's property).
24. See Brown v. Kendall, 6 Mass. 292, 296 (1850) (defining "ordinary care" as "that kind and
degree of care, which prudent and cautious men would use . . . to guard against probable danger");
POSNER, supra note 8, at 183 (noting that many accident cases are won by plaintiffs because cases are
judged not by individual capacities for accident-avoidance but rather in terms of "the average (in legal
parlance 'reasonable') person in each party's situation").
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II. PUBLIC HEALTH POLICIES IN TENSION
Individualistic tort principles seem incompatible with the collective,
population-based perspective central to public health.25 As Wendy Mariner's article
describes, notions of health focus on individual wellness or freedom from
pathology, whereas public health is concerned with promoting optimal health of the
population as a whole.26 Public health seeks more than the aggregation of
individual satisfaction; it seeks the common good.27 Accordingly, individual rights
are constantly in tension with communitarian interests. For example, Garrett
Hardin's classic essay, The Tragedy of the Commons, describes the challenges of
respecting individual interests while promoting societal good.28 In a ranch
community with a common pasture, the interest of each cattle owner individually is
to add cattle to the commons to increase his or her individual productivity. 29 As the
commons becomes more crowded, the yield of each animal decreases, requiring the
ranchers to add more cattle to produce the same level of individual benefit, and so
the cycle continues. 30 Eventually the commons is depleted and can be protected
only through external controls, such as restricting the rights of each individual
owner in favor of the collective good.3 '
25. "Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be
healthy." COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF
PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988); see also LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS: A READER
2 (Lawrence 0. Gostin, ed. 2002) (quoting same); Scott Burris, The Invisibility of Public Health:
Population-Level Measures in a Politics of Market Individualism, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1607, 1608-
09 (1997) (arguing that public health addresses the health of people on a collective, rather than
individual, basis).
26. Wendy K. Mariner, Medicine and Public Health: Crossing Legal Boundaries, 10 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL'Y 121, 144 n.108 (2007); see also Burrs, supra note 25, at 1608 (defining "health" as a
"personal, medical matter, a state of freedom from pathology achieved by an individual through the
mediation of a doctor" and characterizing "[p]ublic health, by contrast ... as an attribute of communities
in social and physical environments" that "ideally, includes not just a high level of well-being for some
but its even distribution throughout a society"); Andrew W. Siegel, The Jurisprudence of Public Health:
Reflections on Lawrence 0. Gostin 's Public Health Law, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 359, 361-
62 (2001) (describing Gostin's distinction between public health law and health care law, and suggesting
that "[p]ublic health law is concerned with the state's role in advancing the health of the community,
whereas health care law is concerned with the 'microrelationships between health care providers and
patients' (quoting LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 15
(2000))).
27. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health of the People: The Highest Law?, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 509, 510
(2004) ("The field of public health would profit from a vibrant conception of 'the common' that sees
public interests as more than the aggregation of individual interests.").
28. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968); see also Kevin
M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health Imperative and Individual
Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 262, 262-63 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2003)
(describing Hardin's essay).
29. Hardin, supra note 28, at 1244; see also Malone & Hinman, supra note 28, at 263.
30. Hardin, supra note 28, at 1244; see also Malone & Hinman, supra note 28, at 263.
31. Hardin, supra note 28, at 1245; see also Malone & Hinman, supra note 28, at 263.
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This classic tension between individual interests and the common good
operates with public health interventions. For example, an individual may prefer
not to be vaccinated based on religious, philosophical, or personal objections-
even utterly irrational reasons. Or someone may wish to avoid substantial or even
infinitesimally small medical risks associated with the vaccine.32 Tort law's
protection of individual autonomy, dignity, and bodily integrity would seem to
allow an individual to refuse vaccination even for foolish reasons or slight
probabilities. But an individual's failure to be vaccinated depletes the "commons"
of a disease-free society by increasing the number of unprotected people in the
population.33
Public health operates from a social contract model according to which
individuals leave the state of nature where they had no choice but to fend for
themselves to join society.34 In so doing, we give up certain individual rights in the
interest of the greater good of society.35 In exchange for giving up those rights,
individuals gain the protections of social order and laws, considered superior to the
state of nature. 6 Classic communitarian public health interventions, such as
mandatory vaccination, quarantine, disease surveillance, and partner notification
are contrary to interests of personal privacy and autonomy, freedom of movement,
and bodily integrity. For example, tort law might recognize a battery for offensive
or nonconsensual touching in the form of a vaccination. 7 Battery protects
individual rights even if the touching might benefit the individual herself or society
at large. By contrast, as Wendy Parmet discusses in her article, outside of the torts
context, courts have recognized constitutional limits on the same interests in liberty
32. Many parents continue to believe that the thimerosal (mercury) preservative in standard
childhood measles, mumps, and rubella vaccines is associated with increased risk of autism, despite
comprehensive studies concluding that there is no link. See, e.g., Michelle Meadows, Institute of
Medicine Report: No Link Between Vaccines and Autism, Sept.-Oct. 2004,
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2004/504-iom.html.
33. See Malone & Hinman, supra note 28, at 263 ("As more and more individuals choose to do
what is in their 'best' individual interest, the common eventually fails as herd immunity disappears and
disease outbreaks occur.").
34. THOMAS HOBBES, MAN AND CITIZEN 112 (Bernard Gert ed., Charles T. Wood et al. trans.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1991) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8-9 (J.W.
Gough ed., 3d ed. reprint, Basil Blackwell, 1976) (1690).
35. HOBBES, supra note 34, at 112; LOCKE, supra note 34, at 8-10.
36. HOBBES, supra note 34, at 112; LOCKE, supra note 34, at 8-10.
37. See O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891) (recognizing potential battery
for vaccination without consent but holding that plaintiff objectively manifested consent by holding her
arm out to the ship doctor). Various facts in the case, however, raise questions regarding the plaintiff's
actual, voluntary consent. Id. The plaintiff, Mary O'Brien, was vaccinated onboard, during her passage
from Queenstown to Boston. Id. At the time, Boston followed strict quarantine regulations for
immigrants. Id. Only persons possessing a certificate from the ship's medical officer could enter the land
without quarantine. Id. In addition, there is indication that O'Brien may not have spoken English and
may not have understood the consequences of submitting to a vaccination or refusing to be vaccinated.
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or bodily integrity. 38 Jacobson v. Massachusetts holds that the state's interest in
providing sanitation and other public health measures limits individual rights,
consistent with the social contract.39
Other public health interventions-safety regulations such as helmet and
seatbelt laws-are classic anti-libertarian laws.4 ° One justification for such laws is
paternalism: protecting people from their own bad judgment and requiring them to
protect themselves, despite their free will to disregard their own safety.4I These
regulations also purport to benefit society in a utilitarian sense by mitigating the
extent of injuries likely to result from inevitable accidents. The lost productivity
and medical expenses associated with those injuries would impose costs on the rest
of society. 42 Other anti-libertarian laws, such as criminal prohibitions on
prostitution or illicit drugs, paternalistically protect individuals from engaging in
unsafe conduct, express moral condemnation of the activities, and aim to reduce
38. Wendy K. Parmet, Public Health and Constitutional Law: Recognizing the Relationship, 10 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 13, 23 (2007) (discussing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26, 39
(1905)); see, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25-26 (upholding a state law that authorized compulsory
vaccinations and criminal sanctions for noncompliance as a valid exercise of state police power and
rejecting the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim); see also Malone &
Hinman, supra note 28, at 271-73 (discussing Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11, and the constitutional basis for
mandatory vaccination laws).
39. As the Court noted:
The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable
conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential
to the safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the community. Even liberty
itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's
own will.
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26-27 (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84 (1851)). The
Court also recognized "the social compact" in the constitution of Massachusetts. Id. at 27.
40. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, FRAZIER'S MAG. (1859), reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed., Oxford University Press 1998) (1991) ("[T]he only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized society, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.").
41. See Stephen P. Teret & Tom Christoffel, Injury Prevention and the Law, in LAW IN PUBLIC
HEALTH PRACTICE, supra note 28, at 403 (noting the "bitter debate over the proprietary of [mandatory
motorcycle helmet] laws," despite their success, and the condemnation "by some as paternalistic
deprivations of highly valued personal freedoms"); Marian Moser Jones & Ronald Bayer, Paternalism
and Its Discontents: Motorcycle Helmet Laws, Libertarian Values, and Public Health, 97 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 208 (2007).
42. See John Leland, The Superstar Athlete Is Paid to Take Risks, Right?, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
2006, § 4, at 3 (commenting on the recent motorcycle crash of Pittsburgh Steelers quarterback Ben
Roethlisberger, who was riding without a helmet, and noting that "[p]olicy debates over seatbelt laws,
cigarettes, gun locks, steroids, environmental safeguards, employee savings plans and storm evacuation
orders" arise from the fact that "society -- or a football team -- has an interest in managing risk, trying to
maximize individual liberty while minimizing the harm to others when one person's gamble doesn't pay
off'); Gostin, supra note 27, at 510 ("Laws designed to promote the common good may sometimes
constrain individual actions (smoking in public places, riding a motorcycle without a helmet, etc.).").
But see Clive Thompson, Bicycle Helmets Put You at Risk, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Dec. 10, 2006, at 36
(citing a study confirming the myth that cyclists wearing helmets are more likely to get hit because
helmet-wearing changes drivers' behavior).
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externalities or "neighborhood effects." 43 Those laws restrict individual freedom to
engage in certain professions or activities but promote the common good.
Also in the name of consumer safety and welfare, strict product liability
judgments against manufacturers of defective products may limit consumer choice
by removing products from the market or making them prohibitively expensive for
consumers. Likewise, some state legislatures and courts prohibit parties from freely
entering certain contracts because the agreements violate public policy. 44 Although
the parties may knowingly and voluntarily agree to give up certain assurances of
safety or rights to sue in exchange for cheaper or otherwise unavailable products,
services, or employment opportunities, lawmakers may restrict individuals'
freedom to trade personal safety for economic benefit. Justifications for
government intervention in economic liberties, such as the inequality of bargaining
power and other market imperfections, are not always convincing.45 Public health
and safety is a more convincing rationale for those paternalistic laws.
Another theme in tort law that seems to fit poorly with public health
objectives is the general lack of a duty to aid, warn, protect, or rescue. In the
interest of personal autonomy and freedom of action, the law generally does not
impose affirmative obligations on actors.46 Instead, liability arises from a plaintiffs
failure to avoid causing harm to others or taking unreasonable risks that expose
others to harm. In most cases, actors are liable for accidental harm only if they are
negligent, meaning that they failed to exercise reasonable care, or the degree of
care expected of a reasonably prudent person acting in the same or similar
circumstances. 47 Accordingly, as a matter of tort liability, there is no duty to
undertake even an easy rescue.48
43. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 30-34 (40th anniversary ed. 2002) (defining
"neighborhood effects" and explaining the rationale for paternalistic laws).
44. E.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 444-46 (Cal. 1963) (invalidating a
patient's agreement to release a charitable research hospital from liability for future negligence as
adverse to the public interest and listing factors relevant to finding express exculpatory agreements
invalid); Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 797-98 (Vt. 1995) (applying a similar analysis to
invalidate commercial recreational ski resort's express exculpatory agreement and noting that
"[n]umerous courts have adopted and applied the Tunkl factors") (citing Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445-46).
45. Compare Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 447 (analyzing a hospital's "decisive advantage in bargaining"
power against the "inferior bargaining position" of a patient requesting to be admitted) with Dalury, 670
A.2d at 799 (noting that the public would be forced to bear "the cost of the resulting injuries" if a ski
resort operator could obtain broad waivers of liability).
46. DOBBS, supra note 9, § 314 (noting it is "widely accepted" that "[u]nless the defendant has
assumed a duty to act, or stands in a special relationship to the plaintiff, defendants are not liable in tort
for a pure failure to act"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (providing that no duty
arises from "[t]he fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for
another's aid or protection").
47. DOBBS, supra note 9, § 117 (outlining the objective reasonable person standard, "often
described as the standard of ordinary care, due care, or reasonable care").
48. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 207-09 (discussing the no-duty rule and providing additional
justifications for not imposing Good Samaritan liability under tort law). But see generally James Barr
Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 110-13 (1908) (urging that the law hold individuals liable
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Consider the standard hypothetical: If A comes across B, who is lying face
down in a puddle, seemingly unconscious and likely to drown if he remains that
way, and A can easily flip B over with his foot, thereby saving his life, is A liable if
he decides simply to walk past B?49 As a matter of morality, the answer may be,
"yes," but as a matter of tort law, the answer is, "no." 50 The law imposes no duty to
rescue, even though in cost-benefit terms, the benefits of the rescue-a life saved-
clearly outweigh the costs-a soiled shoe or few-seconds delay in the course of the
rescuer's day. 5' A real-world example of the no-duty rule, often cited in
Psychology textbooks for illustrating the problem of "diffusion of responsibility,"
is the tragic case of Kitty Genovese, a woman who was stabbed to death on an
urban public street while thirty-eight people watched.5 2 None of the thirty-eight
witnesses responded to her cries, each believing that someone else would come to
her aid.53 As a matter of tort law, however, none of the witnesses could be held
liable. 54 The no-duty rule protects privacy and freedom of action. Individuals may
for "fail[ing] to interfere to save another from impending death or great bodily harm, when he might do
so with little or no inconvenience to himself').
49. 1 understand from a Vanderbilt University Law School alumnus that Professor John Goldberg
gives the hypothetical of a law student who faces the choice of turning a drowning, face-down classmate
over, or proceeding to class, while enjoying a breakfast bagel. From the correct no-duty answer,
Professor Goldberg derives the memorable refrain: "Tort law says, 'eat the bagel!.' See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). The Restatement hypothetical involves "a blind man, about to step
into the street in front of an approaching automobile." Id. The defendant could prevent the accident "by
a word or touch without delaying his own progress," yet the law does not impose a duty upon the
defendant to prevent the blind man from walking into the street. Id. at § 314, illus. 1; see also Yania v.
Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (holding that the defendant had no duty to rescue a drowning
neighbor who jumped into a trench even after the defendant taunted him to do so). It is worth noting that
a "cheap" rescue is not necessarily a "free" rescue, as the would-be rescuer forgoes other opportunities,
such as arriving to class on-time, avoiding a soiled shoe or wet clothes. In addition, imposing a legal
duty to rescue would deprive individuals' freedom of action and the benefits of public recognition of
being a voluntary rescuer. POSNER, supra note 8, at 208.
50. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 283 (Kan. 1903) ("The moral law would obligate
an attempt to rescue a person in a perilous position-as a drowning child-but the law of the land does
not require it, no matter how little personal risk it might involve, provided that the person who declines
to act is not responsible for the peril." (quoting MORTON BARROWS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NEGLIGENCE 4 (1900))); see also David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on
the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REv. 653, 656 (2006) (conducting empirical research on duty to rescue
and concluding that "proven cases of non-rescues are extraordinarily rare, and proven cases of rescues
are exceedingly common-often in hazardous circumstances, where a duty to rescue would not apply in
the first instance").
51. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Learned Hand's classic
utilitarian formulation which defines negligence in terms of cost-justified precautions. By contrast, the
no-duty rule allows defendants to escape liability even for cost-justified rescues.
52. See, e.g., ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 44 (2d ed. 1986); Martin Gansberg, Thirty-
Seven Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the Police, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 27, 1964, at I ("For more than half an
hour 38 respectable, law-abiding citizens in Queens watched a killer stalk and stab a woman in three
separate attacks in Kew Gardens.").
53. BROWN, supra note 52, at 44; Gansberg, supra note 52.
54. BROWN, supra note 52, at 44; Gansberg, supra note 52.
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stay out of others' business and need not delay their own business or risk their own
safety, privacy, or comfort in attempting to aid others.
As often occurs with a seemingly draconian rule, courts no sooner announce
the rule as they begin to identify exceptions. The strict no-duty rule, accordingly,
has been substantially eroded. 55 For example, courts may recognize a duty arising
from a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, especially when
the defendant has custody or control of the plaintiff, thereby depriving the plaintiff
of the ability to protect himself from harm to avail himself of other assistance.
56
The duty arising from a special relationship may extend to a duty to third parties
who may be injured by the conduct of one of the parties.57 Some of these
exceptions recognize that societal interests outweigh individual privacy or
autonomy interests. For example, a therapist whose patient threatens to harm an
identified third party may owe an affirmative duty of reasonable care to the third
party to rescue, warn, or take other steps to prevent the threatened harm from
occurring.58 Courts could extend the duty to third parties to advance public health
objectives, such as infectious disease control and partner notification. 9
55. See, e.g., Mt. Zion State Bank & Trust v. Consol. Commc'ns, 660 N.E.2d 863, 868-71 (Ill.
1995) (stating that a duty may be imposed upon the landowner or party in control of a premises when
there is a latent dangerous condition present and the owner knows or should know of the condition);
Davis v. Virginia, 335 S.E.2d 375, 378 (Va. 1985) (noting that a legal duty may be imposed by
contract); Wallingford v. Kroger Co., 761 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing an
exception to the no-duty rule when a landowner or occupier creates an inherent danger); Clemets v.
Heston, 485 N.E.2d 287, 291 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (discussing the affirmative duty imposed upon a law
officer to protect those the officer has arrested and has in custody); People v. Wong, 588 N.Y.S.2d 119,
124 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (recognizing legal duties created by a contractual babysitting agreement and
the "voluntary assumption of complete and exclusive care of a helpless child"); Sandborg v. Blue Earth
County, 601 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that a legal duty may be imposed by virtue
of a "special relationship" between the parties).
56. See Consumer Health Found. v. Potomac Hosp., No. 97-2550, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 537, at
*4 (4th Cir. 1999) (recognizing a hospital's duty to treat upon "creation of a hospital-patient
relationship" (citing Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (Va. 1977))); Lane v. Commonwealth, 956
S.W.2d 874, 877-79, 881-82 (Ky. 1997) (noting special relationship between a parent and child gives
rise to a legal duty to protect the child from harm); State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 785-86 (N.C. 1982)
(recognizing a duty imposed on parents "to care for their small children" because of their standing in a
personal relationship with child); Sanders v. City of Belle Glade, 510 So. 2d 962, 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that facts of case showed a special relationship between custodian and arrestee that
was analogous to the special relationship between custodian and inmate, which gives rise to a duty to
provide safety); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (extending the duty to act in
categorical special relationships, including common carrier/passenger and innkeeper/guest);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § § 314A cmt. a, 314B (1965) (extending the duty to act in special
relationship of employer/employee).
57. See Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
58. Id. at 343-44; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) ("There is no duty so
to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless.
a special relation exists between the actor and the third person .... ").
59. See Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 522-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that physicians who negligently transfused HIV+ blood to patient owed a duty of care to
patient's sexual partner, who was infected three years after the transfusion). But see Hawkins v. Pizarro,
713 So. 2d 1036, 1037-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that a doctor who negligently advised a
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III. BEYOND PERFECT SAFETY AND FULL COMPENSATION
The goal of tort law is not perfect safety and full compensation at all costs.
We could not have railroads, firearms, or dynamite because we could never justify
the inherent risks to human safety. These examples are extreme, but make the point
that as a society, and as a matter of tort law, we clearly do not value safety over all
else. Human life is not priceless; we make trade-offs all the time, favoring other
interests over the protection of life and safety.6 °
Many torts casebooks introduce the negligence standard for accidental, or
unintentional, torts with a survey of old English common law cases and the
traditional distinction between writs of trespass for direct harm, and trespass on the
case for indirect harm.61 The point is to show the evolution of accident law from its
strict liability origins into the modem fault-based, or negligence, standard of care.
When studying those cases-while deflecting students' inevitable "will this be on
the exam?" queries-I find it useful to trace the historical origins of strict liability
and the historical evolution of the fault-based standard through the machine age
and the industrial revolution.
The traditional common law of trespass held landowners strictly liable for
things escaping from their land, irrespective of due care. For example, in The Case
of the Thorns, a landowner was held strictly liable in trespass for shrub cuttings that
fell onto his neighbor's property, despite the exercise of due care.62 Another
example is Rylands v. Fletcher, which involved a property owner who constructed
a water reservoir to operate a mill. 63 The land previously had been used for coal
patient that she had tested negative for Hepatitis C months before the patient met and married her
husband owed no duty to the husband because his existence was unknown at the time of the negligence).
60. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 20 (1978) (describing society's
attempts to "obscure the fact of tragic scarcity" and suggesting that "we comfort ourselves in the belief
that our society does not establish an acceptable number of auto deaths, but that this figure results from
thousands of independent, atomistic actions"); see also VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH,
ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE 4-5 (expanded ed. 2002) ("The oft-heard statement, 'Health is the
most important goal,' does not accurately describe human behavior. Everyday in manifold ways (such as
overeating and smoking) we make choices that affect our health, and it is clear that we frequently place
a higher value on satisfying other wants.").
61. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 95-105; HARRY SHULMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 23-45 (4th ed. 2003); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 28-30, 160-62 (5th ed. 1984).
62. The Thorns Case, Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, fol 7a, Mich. pl. 18 (1466), reprinted in C. H. S. FIFOOT,
HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 195-97 (1949) ("But if one cuts
his trees and the boughs fall on a man and hurt him, in this case he shall have an action of Trespass.").
63. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868). The plaintiff prevailed at trial, was
reversed by the intermediate appellate court, the Court of Exchequer, and won a reversal at the House of
Lords, the final court of appeal. Id. Under current law, maintaining a water reservoir would likely
qualify as an "abnormally dangerous activity," exposing defendant to strict liability for the escaping
water. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1976) (providing strict liability for
"abnormally dangerous activities," as defined by list of factors contained in § 520); see also Shapo,
supra note 10, at 486 (discussing strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities).
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mining, but the sub-surface shafts were depleted. 64 The plaintiff, the defendant's
neighbor, continued to mine.65 All agreed that the reservoir was competently
constructed with no apparent flaws or defects suggesting lack of reasonable care.66
Nevertheless, because of the sub-surface defects, the reservoir eventually broke
through, flooding the neighbor's mine-shafts. 67 The mill owner was held strictly
liable for water escaping from a non-natural condition on the land. 68 The strict
liability approach to trespass made sense in feudal society, where harm resulted
from wandering animals, flowing water, boughs, and branches. Neighboring
landowners created roughly comparable risks and harmful agents were easily
traceable to their sources.
But strict liability was incompatible with the rise of the machine age and the
industrial revolution, with harm resulting not from animals, water, and naturally
occurring agents but from new-fangled machines and complex instruments.
Machines carried greater risk of harm but also less readily identifiable causation.
Just like escaping animals, the new machines could malfunction or cause injury
despite any want of due care. 69 But often it could not be said what malfunction
occurred. 70 To hold industrial landowners, machine operators, railroads, mining
operations, and automobile drivers strictly liable for harm caused by their activities
would cause the wheels of progress to grind to a halt. 71 The negligence standard, by
contrast, allowed room for industrial progress, despite the inevitable harm and
injury. The courts rationally compromised safety in favor of other societal wants
and needs. In Losee v. Buchanan, the landmark United States opinion rejecting the
English common law strict liability rule in favor of a negligence approach, the
court noted: "We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads. They
are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and lay at the base of all our
civilization. 7 2 The court's holding derived from the very same social contract
themes that animate much of public health law:
By becoming a member of civilized society, I am compelled to give up
many of my natural rights, but I receive more than a compensation from
64. Rylands, 3 L.R.E. & 1. App. at 331.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 332.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 342.
69. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 71 (1977)
("The earliest efforts to limit the scope of [tort] liability in American law centered not on any grand
conception of the nature of legal responsibility but on the need to reduce the burden of damage
judgments and to make economic planning more coherent.").
70. Id. at 66.
71. Id.
72. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484 (1873); see also Shapo, supra note 11, at 3-21
(describing the twentieth century as a "society of many fault lines," in which "[j]oggers, cyclists and
horse riders compete for the same paths; neighbors quarrel about the use of power lawn mowers and-a
problem of enormous magnitude-a bewildering variety of vehicles struggles through hundreds of rush
hours every day").
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the surrender by every other man of the same rights, and the security,
advantage and protection which the laws give me.73
For example, we give up our natural and absolute rights for the enjoyment of land,
meaning that we must tolerate certain inevitable, accidental harms-namely, those
caused despite due care by our neighbors-without recompense.74 At the same
time, we gain the right to engage in certain dangerous activities, shielded by the
law of negligence from having to make amends to our neighbors, as long as we act
with reasonable care.75
Strict liability nonetheless persists in United States law for certain types of
conduct, including so-called abnormally dangerous activities-activities that
cannot be made any safer through the exercise of reasonable care yet are valued by
society.76 We do not want actors to cease operations altogether but do want the
responsible actors to pay for the benefits they receive from the activities. 77 As a
result, we hold defendants strictly liable. Classic examples of abnormally
dangerous activities include blasting operations, dynamite storage, atomic energy
plants, oil wells, water reservoirs, and insecticide spraying.7 8 We allow, and
perhaps even encourage, the operations to continue despite the inherent danger but
leave it up to individual actors to decide when the price becomes too high to bear.
Liability is imposed for those activities not as a suggestion to cease the activity but
rather as a societal tax on the actor. The actor, not the law, makes the cost-benefit
determination whether the liability costs of engaging in the activity outweigh the
profits derived from engaging in it. The conduct may continue as long as the
defendant "pays [his] way., 79 Accordingly, the abnormally dangerous activity
73. Losee, 51 N.Y. at 484.
74. Id. at 484-85.
75. See id.
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (providing that "[o]ne who carries on an
abnormally dangerous activity" is liable "although he has exercised the utmost care"); see also id. § 520
(listing six factors for determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous).
77. See id. § 520 cmt. b (distinguishing negligence by explaining that "§ 519 is applicable to an
activity that is carried on with all reasonable care, and that is of such utility that the risk which is
involved in it cannot be regarded as so great or so unreasonable as to make it negligence merely to carry
on the activity at all"); Shapo, supra note 10, at 486 (discussing common law strict liability and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977), noting "[v]ery simply, strict liability is liability
without fault, in the sense that the activity at issue is appraised as one that was permissible, rather than
(like speeding on the highway) as conduct that should not have occurred").
78. See, e.g., City of Joliet v. Harwood, 86 11. 110 (1877) (blasting); Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990) (chemical shipping); Exner v. Sherman Power
Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931) (dynamite storage); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig.,
350 F. Supp. 2d 871 (E.D. Wash. 2004) (nuclear weapons plant); Old Island Fumigation, Inc. v. Barbee,
604 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (pest control); Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330
(H.L. 1868) (water reservoir).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 cmt. d (1977) ("The defendant's enterprise ... is
required to pay its way by compensating for the harm it causes, because of its special, abnormal and
dangerous character."); DOBBS, supra note 9, § 346 ("The idea is not necessarily to deter such activities
altogether but to make them 'pay their way' by charging them with liability for harms that are more or
less inevitably associated with the activity.").
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doctrine serves the dual purpose of compensating injured plaintiffs without
depriving the general public of valuable services and products.8 0
Moreover, as a matter of fairness, tort liability should fall on the party
conducting or creating the unusual risk. As between two automobile drivers, one
who is speeding and one who runs a red light, there is not a strong basis for
imposing liability on one versus the other in terms of risk-creation. The risks of
speeding and red-light-running are roughly proportional; those are the sorts of risks
that people in society generally impose on one another. Accordingly, liability can
be allocated according to relative fault for the accident. But the owner of a
dynamite blasting, insecticide, or fireworks factory, or airline, wild-animal owner,
or oil-drilling operation, is imposing a much greater risk than the rest of us. Thus, it
seems fair that the party creating an abnormal, or nonreciprocal, risk be held strictly
liable for any resulting accident.8 l Likewise, persons or entities whose activities
endanger the public's health should pay accordingly.
IV. SOCIAL WELFARE, UTILITARIANISM, AND TORTS
Public health seeks to promote the good of society as a whole. The welfare of
the community transcends and takes precedence over private interests.8 2 Policies
central to tort law likewise promote the greater good of the whole, sometimes at the
expense of individual interests. An essential first-year doctrine, and one of the few
topics in Torts that feels concrete and rule-based to law students eager for certainty
in the common law maze, is Judge Learned Hand's famous "Hand Formula." The
Hand Formula is a self-conscious, utilitarian expression of negligence in algebraic
terms: the defendant is deemed negligent if B < PL, where B is the burden, or cost,
of a given safety precaution that could have prevented the injury of which the
plaintiff complains; L is the magnitude of the plaintiffs loss, or injury, and all
other loss that could be avoided with the same precaution; and P is the probability
of the harm occurring, used as a discounting factor against L. 83 The Hand Formula
80. Strict products liability operates from a similar calculus. See infra Section V (discussing mass
torts).
81. See generally Fletcher, supra note 12, at 547 (suggesting that uncommon or dangerous
activities, "like blasting, fumigating, and crop dusting stand out as distinct, nonreciprocal risks in the
community" and "represent threat of harm that exceed the level of risk to which all members of the
community contribute in roughly equal shares").
82. See GOSTtN, supra note 25, at 77-78 (suggesting that commonwealth themes were central to the
Framers: "The central principles underlying the police or regulatory power were the treatment of health
and safety as a shared purpose and need of the community and (aside from basic constitutional rights
such as due process) the subordination of the market, property, and individual liberty to protect
compelling community interests .... Public health and safety are community or group interests ... that
can transcend and take priority over private interests if the legislature so chooses.").
83. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (announcing rule for
determining barge owner's duty to secure his ship as a "function of three variables: (1) The probability
that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate
precautions," represented by P, L, and B, respectively, where "liability depends upon whether B is less
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provides that defendants are liable in negligence for failing to take the cheaper
precautions. 84 But there is no liability if the safety precaution, even if feasible, is
too costly relative to the "utils" of safety gained.85
The Hand Formula recognizes that we live in a society of scarce resources
and must make decisions about how to allocate those resources in the interest of
society as a whole, not just the interest of an individual seeking compensation for
an injury.86 If resources were unlimited, there would be no reason, arguably, not to
take every possible safety precaution. But resources are limited; therefore, every
safety-related expense takes away from resources that could be spent on other
goods or services. If we did not care about fuel-efficiency, comfort, aesthetics,
speed, hauling-capacity, and other features of cars, presumably we could build
them perfectly safely, with spongy bumpers, 87 three-point restraints, helmets, and
ten-mile-per-hour top speeds. 88 Even seemingly "costless" precautions carry lost
opportunity costs, which must be considered. For example, an easy precaution
against car collisions is simply to stay home and not drive. A law student who opts
for that safety precaution seems to lose nothing and may even be better off for not
having expended fuel, tire-wear, and other out-of-pocket costs associated with
driving. But the burden, or B, of that precaution must also include the lost
opportunity to attend class, further his education, or enjoy a pre-class bagel.89
than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL"); POSNER, supra note 8, at 180-81 (discussing the
operation of the Hand formula); Shapo, supra note 11, at 4-15 to -16 (summarizing the same).
84. See, e.g., Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 91 N.W. 880, 881-82 (Neb. 1902) (holding
railroad negligent for failing to install lock on turntable when child's foot was caught and severed and it
was known that children played in train yard); The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1932)
(holding barge company liable in negligence for failing to have weather radio because precaution was
cost-justified, despite the fact that radio sets were not customary in shipping industry); Uloth v. City
Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978) ("If a slight change in design would prevent serious,
perhaps fatal, injury, the designer may not avoid liability by simply warning of the possible injury.").
85. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 180 (explaining that comparing expected accident costs and
accident prevention costs means "stopping investing in more safety at the point where another dollar
spent would yield a dollar or less in added safety"); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Can Efficiency in Health Care Be
Left to the Market?, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 967, 970 (2001) (representing resources as
"quantifiable degrees of human happiness measured in units economists call utils").
86. See generally CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 60, at 18 (noting that "though scarcity can
often be avoided for some goods by making them available without cost to everyone, it cannot be
evaded for all goods. In the distribution of scarce goods society has to decide which methods of
allotment to use").
87. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 136-37
(1977). Credit for my awareness of the memorable "spongy bumpers" reference must go to my own
Torts professor, Michael L. Wells, Professor and Marion and W. Colquitt Carter Chair in Tort and
Insurance Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
88. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071-72 (4th Cir. 1974) (providing
that standards of safety will be balanced against the utility of design and purpose of the specific type of
vehicle).
89. See supra note 49 (referencing Professor Goldberg's hypothetical); see also Kimbar v. Estis,
135 N.E.2d 708, 710-11 (N.Y. 1956) (rejecting claim that summer camp operator was negligent for
failing to light path in woods when child who stepped off path broke his nose by bumping into a tree,
noting that holding camp liable would deny "youth ... the adventure, of living closer to nature ....
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The Hand Formula implicitly rebuts the notion that any resources, including
human lives, are priceless. If human life were priceless, there would be no limit to
the amount that could be spent on safety precautions because the L of the Formula
would always exceed any potential B. But no individual human life is priceless
under the Hand Formula. Social welfare is advanced not by taking every possible
safety precaution but only those that are cost-justified, even at the expense of
human life.90 In short, the Hand Formula, like communitarian values underlying
public health law, recognizes that individual interests and rights, even the most
fundamental, must yield to the greater good of the commonwealth.
A good example of the Hand Formula's operation in promoting public health
is Helling v. Carey.9' A 32-year-old woman sued her ophthalmologist, alleging his
negligent failure to diagnose primary open-angle glaucoma, which resulted in
severe and permanent vision lOSS. 9 2 The parties agreed that the professional
standard of care for ophthalmologists did not require routine glaucoma testing for
patients under the age of forty.93 Glaucoma could be detected by a simple puff of
air to test eye pressure.94 The incidence of glaucoma in persons younger than forty
was one in 25,000.95 Applying a Hand Formula analysis, a jury could find that the
B of a relatively cheap, painless eye-pressure test, balanced against the serious,
high-magnitude L of permanent vision loss, even discounted by the relatively low P
of one in 25,000 for patients in the plaintiff's age-group, suggested that the doctor
was negligent for failing to administer the test, contrary to the professional standard
of practice for ophthalmologists.
Helling is a poor case for teaching the standard of care for medical
malpractice inasmuch as the court independently determined the standard of due
[and] would frequently compel camps to keep boys confined after dark and thereby effectively spell the
end of some of the most desirable activities of real camping life").
90. Indeed, the fact that human life and all other elements of compensatory damages are included in
the Formula leads to philosophical, practical, and scientific objections to the Formula. It may be morally
objectionable, for example, to suggest that a defendant is negligent in failing to prevent fire to a high-
rise executive office building but not to a coal mine, where the B and P of each accident is the same but
the L includes lost earnings, which are much higher for the office building than the coal mine. See
POSNER, supra note 8, at 209-14 (discussing damages and earnings disparities). Practical objections
relate to the difficulty estimating the monetary value of life and damages generally as well as risks,
probabilities, and precautions. See, e.g., Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949) (describing
how Hand himself recognized the difficulties in applying the Formula). The Formula is psychologically
questionable in that it assumes that people operate at all times as rational cost-benefit analysts,
calculating the relative worth of each step they take. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 179-83; CALABRESI &
BOBBITT, supra note 60, at 198-225; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS I (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000) (describing social scientists' insights into rational choice
models, noting that "models are often wrong in the simple sense that they yield inaccurate predictions.
People are not always 'rational' in the sense that economists suppose").
91. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
92. Id. at 981-82.
93. Id. at 982.
94. Id. at 983.
95. Id.
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care, contrary to professional standards.96 The standard of care for professional
negligence is not the reasonably prudent person, but a customary, or professional,
standard. Parties generally must present expert evidence establishing both the
standard of care and the manner in which the defendant's conduct fell short.97 The
court and fact-finder may decide between opposing experts' views but are not free
to ignore the expert testimony and apply a different standard. In other words,
professional custom is conclusive of the standard of care; it is not merely "some
evidence" that the jury may consider or ignore.98
The court in Helling nevertheless rejected the prevailing professional standard
of care, citing Justice Holmes's rationale in The TJ Hooper for rejecting the
custom of the shipping industry as the standard of care because an "entire calling
may be lagging." 99 In the court's view, the physician's decision whether to
administer the glaucoma test did not require the exercise of professional judgment.
Therefore, the court's negligence analysis was not constrained by the professional
standard of care.100 Moreover, the court suggested that, as a matter of fairness,
people under the age of forty are entitled to the same safety protection as people
over the age of forty.' 01
In Hand Formula terms, the court's decision makes sense. From a public
health perspective, the decision may be laudable because it embodies a net positive
for society in terms of resource expenditures. Collectively, we garner a substantial
net gain in terms of health outcomes-preventing the permanent disability of
blindness-for minimal cost in real dollars (a puff of air) and inconvenience (a few
seconds). Holding a physician liable for failing to take a cost-justified precaution
that could improve health outcomes seems rational and consistent with
communitarian and utilitarian principles. By refusing to apply the professional
96. Id.; see POSNER, supra note 8, at 185 (suggesting that medical malpractice cases are one area of
negligence in which courts "have traditionally allowed a defense of custom"); RAND ROSENBLATT ET
AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 862-63 (1997) (describing Helling as "[t]he most
famous (and largely unique) recent health law case purporting to overrule a professional standard" by
relying on The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, (2d Cir. 1932)).
97. See Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that medical malpractice
plaintiff "must present expert witnesses since the technical complexity of the facts and issues usually
prevents the jury itself from determining both the appropriate standard of care and whether the
defendant's conduct conformed to that standard" (citations omitted)); ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note
96, at 843 (noting that plaintiffs, "in most instances," must "find an expert medical witness willing to
testify that the defendant doctor violated the professional standard of care").
98. Robbins, 553 F.2d at 126-27; Shapo, supra note 10, at 489 (noting that courts require expert
testimony to establish that defendant fell below the standard of care); ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note
96, at 843 ("[B]y the later nineteenth century American judicial doctrine accorded the customary
practices of doctors virtually conclusive weight as to what constituted 'reasonable care"').
99. Helling, 519 P.2d at 983 (citing The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, discussed supra note 84, and
accompanying text); cf Shapo, supra note 10, at 484 (noting that industry standards generally are
evidence of due care but not conclusive).
100. Helling, 519 P.2d at 983 (concluding that "reasonable prudence required the timely giving of
the pressure test ... irrespective of its disregard by the standards of the ophthalmology profession").
101. Id.
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standard, the court prevented the temptation for physicians and other professionals
to "low-ball" society on public health and safety. From a medical perspective,
however, the case is troubling. 10 2 Do we want courts and lay-jurors defining
standards of care for medical professionals? Will the uncertainty regarding what is
required of physicians undermine predictability and consistency in tort law, leading
to unfairness to defendants? Will tort decisions lead to increased practice of
"defensive medicine" and waste of societal resources in unnecessary precautions,
tests, and medical procedures?'
0 3
V. THE "OBVIOUS" EXAMPLE: PRODUCTS, POLLUTION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH
Perhaps the closest alignment of tort law and public health law is in cases
involving products or activities that resulted in serious, detrimental health effects
on a population. I say "obvious" because mass torts seek to remedy broad societal
harm from dangerous or defective consumer products, environmental pollution,
toxic substances, and other agents. So viewed, mass tort litigation promotes
collective responsibility and population-based health. By bringing these hazards to
light and imposing liability on the risk-creators, tort lawyers and class
representatives act collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy,
consistent with public health goals.1°4 Examples include: asbestos, lead paint,
silicone breast implants, Dalkon Shield, DES, tobacco, and firearms. 10 5 Litigation
has also challenged various vehicle defects, including gas tanks, rollovers, tires,
and airbags.10 6 Other recent cases involved pharmaceutical products such as Phen-
102. See Peter D. Jacobson & Matthew L. Kanna, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in the Courts: Recent
Trends and Future Prospects, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 291, 303 (2001) (discussing Helling as an
example of cost-effectiveness analysis in medical liability cases).
103. Id. (summarizing criticisms of Helling).
104. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (citing the IOM definition of public health and
discussing the population-based perspective).
105. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (N.Y. 2001) (overturning a
jury verdict against multiple firearms manufacturers on negligent marketing theory); Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (N.Y. 1989) (holding manufacturers of diethylstilbestrol ("DES")
liable for harm to daughters of women who took the drug while pregnant); Thomas ex rel. Gramling v.
Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005) (discussing lead paint); Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global
Peace: A (Briel) Genealogy of the Class Action Crisis, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 719 (2006) (describing
Agent Orange, asbestos, and other examples); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Reporting From the Front Line-
One Mediator's Experience With Mass Torts, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 359 (1998) (describing Dalkon
Shield, silicone breast implants, tobacco, and other examples); Deborah R. Hensler & Mark. A.
Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
961 (1993) (discussing the same).
106. See GOSTIN, supra note 25, at 265-67 (introducing chapter on "Tort Litigation for the Public's
Health" and describing examples); Jon S. Vemick et al., Role of Litigation in Preventing Product-
Related Injuries, 25 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVIEWS: INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL 90, 92-96 (Stephen
B. Thacker & Ellen J. MacKenzie eds. 2003) (describing examples, including: Firestone tires, swine flu
vaccine, seatbelts, pacemakers, and handguns); see generally DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW 1072-94 (2005).
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Fen, 10 7 Oxy-Contin, 10 8 and Vioxx.' 09 Litigants have even attempted to address the
obesity epidemic though litigation, suing fast food vendors for misrepresenting
their products as part of a healthy lifestyle. " 0
From the perspective of mainstream tort theories, however, mass torts and
class action litigation are anything but obvious. In the main, tort law seeks to
allocate responsibility and loss-bearing as between individual victims and
injurers. 1 ' Products liability and mass torts play fast-and-loose with traditional tort
principles of fault, causation, and damages. 1 2 Strict application of tort rules could
bar recovery in many cases and thereby compromise public health objectives.' 13 To
facilitate the process of public interest oriented lawsuits, judges have devised an
entire set of judicial procedures to facilitate class litigation."l 4
As noted above, the popular perception is that trial lawyers are motivated not
by public health but by profit, enlisting litigants and bringing these actions, often
on a contingency fee basis, to gamer the hefty awards and fees." 5 Although
plaintiffs' attorneys may enjoy substantial proceeds in some product liability or
mass torts cases, they may also perform a valuable public service, exposing
dangerous products and pushing manufacturers to improve safety." 6 Tort litigation
can operate as informal regulation when the government has refused, failed, or
107. E.g., HPF, L.L.C. v. Gen. Star indem. Co., 788 N.E.2d 753 (I11. App. Ct. 2003); In re Diet Drug
Litig., 895 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005).
108. E.g., Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 821 N.E.2d 141 (Ohio 2004); Price v. Purdue Pharma
Co., 920 So. 2d 479 (Miss. 2006).
109. E.g., Int'l Union of Operating Engr's Local #68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc., 894 A.2d
1136 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); Rutherford v. Merck & Co., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 842 (S.D. Ill.
2006).
110. E.g., Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 396 F. Supp. 2d 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
111. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1356-57 (1995) (describing judicial skepticism to mass tort class actions because
of the presence of individual issues of causation, harm, and defenses).
112. See RiCHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 6 (1980) (tracing development
of products liability law, as "surg[ing] toward ever greater public control," in the context of which
"courts have radically defined the relative obligations of manufacturers and consumers").
113. See id. at 5-6 (noting that "rigorous requirements of proof everywhere blocked the plaintiff' in
earlier products liability law and that "many of the barriers to recovery could not be justified either as a
matter of substantive principle or administrative necessity").
114. See Coffee, supra note 11, at 1358-67 (discussing judicial procedure evolution of mass tort
litigation).
115. See Crawford, supra note 4 (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch's description of Vioxx as a lawyers'
"feeding frenzy" and a spokesperson for the American Tort Reform Association's comment that in class
actions, "the bigger the award, the bigger the cut that the lawyers get," adding, "[y]ou can't tell me that
some of these lawyers aren't motivated purely by greed").
116. See id. (noting that Vioxx lawyers assert that advertising on the Internet "helps them offer a
necessary public service" and the Internet enables them to "reach out to victims who otherwise would
not know that they have a claim"); Taylor & Thomas, supra note 4 (suggesting that trial lawyers "have
positioned themselves as the guardian of the little man against the corporations").
2007]
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
lacks resources to adequately protect consumers' safety.' 1 7 In rare cases, punitive
damages may be awarded, punishing manufacturers for consciously or recklessly
ignoring consumer safety."18 Ralph Nader's expos6 of the Chevrolet Corvair and
General Motors' attempts to silence him are almost synonymous with public
interest litigation challenging manufacturers' reluctance to invest in product
safety. 119 In those cases, tort law policies, including compensating injured
individuals, deterring dangerous activities, creating incentives for safety, and
efficiently allocating scarce resources, are consistent with public health objectives
to reduce injury and disease. 120
A. Strict Liability and Fault Revisited
Many cases addressing public health hazards are brought as products liability
actions. Products liability law purports to impose liability without fault on anyone
who is engaged in the business of manufacturing or selling unsafe products.12' The
cases seem to revive the old English common law of strict liability or borrow
heavily from the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities. 122 But the standards
for determining liability in the largest category of products cases-design defects-
come very close to a negligence, or fault-based, approach. 123 The intrusion of fault-
based principles into purportedly strict products liability again suggests that the law
117. See Vernick et al., supra note 106, at 91 (noting that when there has been a failure of
government regulation, litigation becomes an important prevention tool); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public
Health Law: A Renaissance, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 136, 137 (2002) ("Tort litigation can provide strong
incentives for businesses to engage in less risky activities. Litigation has been used as a tool of public
health to influence manufacturers of automobiles, cigarettes, and firearms.").
118. See Galanter, supra note 3, at 1130 (providing data on low frequency of punitive awards in
product liability cases); Laura J. Hines, Obstacles to Determining Punitive Damages in Class Actions,
36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889 (2001).
119. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN
AUTOMOBILE 32, 34 (updated 1972) (describing Corvair suspension design defect that required drivers
to maintain tire pressure within narrow ranges); see Jones & Bayer, supra note 41, at 209 (noting that
Nader's book lead to the 1966 National Highway Safety Act).
120. See GOSTIN, supra note 25, at 265 (suggesting that "[tihe goals of tort law, although
imperfectly achieved, are frequently consistent with public .health objectives" and describing tort
policies).
121. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal. 1963) (holding the
manufacturer of a defective lathe strictly liable without a showing of warranty or negligence);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998) ("One engaged in the business of
selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to
liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect."); OWEN, supra note 106, at 32-34
(describing the strict products liability theory of liability).
122. See supra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998) (defining design defect
as "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design"); see MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 92-98 (2006) (describing both the risk-utility test and the consumer expectations test, and
discussing the "negligence-based evolutionary path"); Phillips, supra note 13, at 833-34 (suggesting that
the Reporters of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS would "place the standard of liability [for design
defects] squarely in negligence").
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is animated by concerns other than perfect safety and full compensation. To
achieve those ends, courts have softened the strictness of products liability law. A
product may be found defective either because it falls below the ordinary
consumer's expectations of product safety or because the risks of the challenged
design outweigh the benefits. 124 The risk-benefit calculus in products liability
applies in hindsight, rather than as a foreseeability test in negligence.
Manufacturers are strictly liable if the risks of the final product outweigh the
benefits, even if they exercised all due care when initially designing the product.
The consumer expectations test, however, applies only when products are "used in
an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner,' '125 which seems to tie liability to
foreseeability, or risks perceived in advance.
Products liability, like negligence and abnormally dangerous activities,
operates from a utilitarian calculus. Even the most stringent, no-fault formulations
of strict products liability are not aimed at perfect safety. 126 Indeed, if that were so,
consumers would be denied a whole range of useful yet dangerous products,
including everything from children's toys to automobiles to medical devices to
firearms. Just as American courts in the industrial age recognized the inevitability,
and non-compensability, of some level of accidental injury, products liability law
allows some hazardous products to stay on the market and product-related injuries
to go uncompensated.
Through tort judgments, product manufacturers and sellers are encouraged to
independently evaluate the costs and benefits of continuing to make and sell the
product in question. The fact that a product is deemed "defective" does not
necessarily mean that the manufacturer should cease production. Like those
engaged in abnormally dangerous activities, manufacturers should "pay their way."
A tort judgment against the manufacturer may operate as an incentive to make the
product safer or to adopt an alternative design in order to reduce liability
exposure. 127 Despite the imposition of liability, however, the ultimate cost-benefit
124. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978) (defining design
defect alternatively as "product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect" or the
"risk of danger inherent in [the challenged] design" outweighs the benefits); see Shapo, supra note 10, at
492 (describing both tests and the dispute over the Restatement's adoption of exclusive risk-utility test).
125. Barker, 573 P.2d at 457.
126. See, e.g., Shetterly v. Crown Controls Corp., 719 F. Supp. 385, 403 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff d 898
F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding no liability on manufacturer of pallet truck, despite the absence of a
reasonable alternative design, because the benefits of the product in terms of increased productivity and
decreased costs outweighed risks, even when eight workers suffered sprained, twisted, and broken
ankles).
127. Considerable controversy exists over the "reasonable alternative design," or "RAD," feature of
design defect claims. Some advocate that plaintiffs must prove existence of a RAD as an element of the
claim and others urge that products may be deemed defective even without proof of a RAD. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1998) (suggesting that plaintiff
must prove RAD); Phillips, supra note 13, at 852-56 (describing dispute); Shapo, supra note 10, at 492
(noting same); see, e.g., Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc. 450 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. 1994) ("[T]he
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calculus is left to the manufacturer. If a manufacturer determines that the profit or
other benefit derived from selling the "defective" product outweighs the risk of
future tort liability, manufacturing of that product may continue. A tort judgment
does not operate as an injunction or "cease-and-desist order., 128 Therefore, product
liability law serves both individual compensation and community benefit goals.
The injured consumer is compensated for injury, but the rest of society is not
deprived access to an otherwise useful product.
Products liability was initially conceived as "strict," in the sense that a
manufacturer would be absolutely liable for placing a dangerous product in the
stream of commerce, without regard to privity, warranty, or want of due care. 129
That view comports with the compensation goal of torts by easing plaintiffs'
burdens of proving fault. Moreover, the cost of injury was placed on manufacturers,
who are in a better position than individual victims to bear the loss and spread it
among other members of society. 130 But over time, products liability law has
incorporated elements of negligence and relative risk-bearing responsibilities
among members of society for much the same reason that negligence replaced strict
liability as the standard of care. As a society, we have wants other than safety that
would not be served by imposing liability too readily on dangerous but desirable
products.
B. Causation and Probabilities
In addition to less-than-strict liability standards, products law has allowed
less rigorous proof of causation than traditional tort claims. Tort law generally
requires a plaintiff to show a causal link between the defendant's wrongful conduct
and the plaintiffs injury. A punch thrown that misses its victim is not a battery, and
the puncher is not liable.131 As Judge Cardozo announced: "Proof of negligence in
the air, so to speak, will not do."' 132 In many products liability and environmental
reasonableness of choosing from among various alternative product designs and adopting the safest one
if it is feasible is considered the 'heart' of design defect cases ....").
128. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998) ("Because
manufacturers invest in quality control at consciously chosen levels, their knowledge that a predictable
number of flawed products will enter the marketplace entails an element of deliberation about the
amount of injury that will result from their activity."); see Phillips, supra note 13, at 838 (discussing
policies and trade-offs underlying the Restatement's approach to design defects).
129. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963); see EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, supra note 112, at 36-39 (describing cases and origins of strict products liability).
130. See EPSTEIN, supra note 112, at 46-48 (discussing the hardship effects and the ease of insurance
rationales for strict products liability).
131. A punch thrown that hits another, unintended victim, however, is a battery on the theory of
transferred intent. See Cames v. Thompson, 48 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Mo. 1932) ("Defendant's intention, in
such a case, is to strike an unlawful blow, to injure some person by his act, and it is not essential that the
injury be to the one intended."); Talmage v. Smith, 59 N.W. 656 (Mich. 1894).
132. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) (citing POLLOCK, TORTS 455 (1 1th
Ed.)); Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920)).
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harm cases, it may be difficult or impossible for plaintiffs to establish the necessary
causal links. Insistence on strict cause-in-fact proof could defeat many cases in
which there is acknowledged wrongdoing and obvious harm. In many products
cases, the injured plaintiff may be unable to prove not only the cause of the harm
but the party causing the harm. Without an identified defendant, the products
liability claim could not get even a foot inside the courthouse door.
The problem of identifying the responsible party is not unique to products
liability law. Take the classic case of Summers v. Tice, involving a quail-hunting
party. 133 Two members of the party fired negligently into the air. Another person
was injured by a single bullet and could not establish which of the two defendants'
wild shots caused his harm. On the theory that either bullet could have caused the
injury and that each hunter was acting carelessly, the court relied on a fiction of
joint-and-several liability, allowing the plaintiff to recover his full damages from
either hunter.134 The case is a fiction because the plaintiffs claim should have
failed for failing to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the cause-in-fact of
the injury. Instead of denying recovery, the court shifted the burden to the
defendants to sort out who caused the harm; either defendant could avoid liability
for the full harm by demonstrating that he was not the cause.
135
An even more contorted application of the burden-shifting approach to
causation is seen in Ybarra v. Spangard,136 cited in Summers, in which a plaintiff
who was injured while unconscious on an operating table could not prove which of
several persons present during the surgery caused his harm. The court shifted the
burden to all the persons present in the operating room to prove that he or she was
not the cause, on pain of being held jointly and severally liable for the full harm if
unable to carry that burden. 137 The cases are dramatic because they relieve the
plaintiff of proving an essential element of the negligence claim--causation-and
133. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
134. Id. at 2-3; see EPSTEIN, supra note 112, at 155 (suggesting that "Summers was incorrect in its
insistence that each hunter could be liable for the full damages"). Joint and several liability is the wrong
theory in this case, however, because the two actors were not acting in concert, nor did their conduct
combine to produce one, indivisible injury. More correctly, Summers represents the theory of
"alternative liability." See DOBBS, supra note 9, §§ 385, 386 (discussing joint and several liability); id. §
175 (discussing Summers); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 277-79 (2003) (discussing
theories of joint and multiple liability, including acting in concert and alternative liability).
135. Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.
136. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944). The case is often covered as an illustration of res ipsa loquitur, but it
contorts that theory of negligence as well by allowing recovery based on the suggestion that the injury
ordinarily would not happen without negligence, despite lack of proof of the identity of the defendant,
the injury causing instrumentality, or the defendant's exclusive control of the instrumentality. See
SHAPO, supra note 134, at 249 (listing elements of the res ipsa loquitor doctrine); Byrne v. Boadle,
(1863) 2 Hurlestone & Coltman 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (applying the theory to hold property owner
liable for barrel of flour falling out of second-story window); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 328D (1965).
137. Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 691.
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of even identifying the proper defendant.. All possible defendants, in turn, face
liability unless they absolve themselves by proving lack of causation.
The results in Summers and Ybarra serve the goal of compensating the
injured party, without insisting on strict proof of causation. But only Summers can
be justified on the basis of sending the appropriate message about safety to the
careless defendants. Strict insistence on "but for" causation in Summers would have
defeated the claim, leaving an admitted wrong, a serious injury, and no remedy for
the injured party. The Summers fiction might be tolerated when we know that both
parties failed to exercise due care but cannot tell which caused the injury. By
imposing liability on the hunter who got lucky because his shot went into the
woods, he still got the proper message for safety. But the fairness and deterrence
rationales are harder to see in Ybarra. Why should an innocent nurse who was
present at the time of the negligence face liability when he did nothing wrong?
Liability in that case may undermine public health by making actors reticent or
overly cautious in the future.
Cases like Summers and Ybarra that relax the causation requirement are
significant for products liability and public health litigation. Suppose two factories,
A and B, operate on either side of a river. Each factory dumps sludge into the river.
A downstream landowner is injured when the sludge piles up on his lawn. But he
cannot prove which polluter was the source of the particular waste. Using the
Summers alternative liability theory, the landowner should be allowed to sue either
Factory A or Factory B for the full harm. The landowner would be compensated for
the wrong, the factory owners would get a message about the costs of pollution,
and the public would benefit to the extent that liability or potential for liability
encouraged both factories to adopt improved waste-disposal practices.
Perhaps the case is even easier than Summers if we assume that both factories
contributed to a single, indivisible injury of the downstream sludge pile, for which
either defendant could be held jointly and severally liable. But joint and several
liability has largely been displaced in favor of proportional liability.'38 If the
landowner sues both factories, how would a court apportion fault? There is nothing
characteristic or distinguishable about Factory A's sludge compared to Factory B's
sludge; therefore, there would be no way to say which portion of the landowner's
harm is attributable to which defendant. One solution would be to require each
defendant to pay a portion of the damages based on the portion of sludge it dumped
into the river, irrespective of how much of its sludge, in fact, ended up on the
plaintiff-landowner's lawn.
This market share approach to liability, like Summers, does not insist on proof
of a one-to-one correlation between injurer and injured. But, like Summers, it seems
fair as long as all of the defendants were bad actors, producing potential harm.
Courts relied on the market share approach to allocate liability for claims made by
138. DOBBS, supra note 9, § 390 (noting that joint and several liability may no longer be applied to
indivisible injuries).
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hundreds of women and their daughters harmed by some three hundred
manufacturers of a drug, diethylstilbestrol ("DES"), that was marketed as a prenatal
vitamin.' 39 The plaintiffs could not establish which manufacturer produced their
particular prescription, but the court allowed recovery, proportional to market
share, against all pharmaceutical companies manufacturing the drug.
Using the market share approach, the landowner might recover from both
Factory A and Factory B even though one factory may have had no part in causing
that plaintiffs injury. As long as there is proof that both committed a wrong-
released the sludge-and the plaintiff was injured by sludge, the plaintiff can
recover from either or both factories, despite the distinct possibility that all of the
sludge that ended up on the plaintiff's lawn was from Factory A and not an ounce
was from Factory B. As long as both Factory A and Factory'B produced noxious
waste that caused harm, if not to this landowner in particular, perhaps to another
landowner who chose not to sue, placing liability on both factories properly assigns
the equities and incentives for safety. From a public health perspective, there would
be much to gain by telling both factories that pollution leads to liability, and much
to lose if the landowner had to bear the cost of a pile of sludge on his lawn when
faced with the impossible task of proving whose sludge it was.
How far should we extend traditional tort principles and reliance on
probabilities in the name of public health? Consider a variation on the classic "blue
bus" hypothetical: While walking at night on a dark road, the plaintiff is struck by
an oncoming bus in a hit-and-run accident. 140 In the darkness and glare of the
headlights, the plaintiff cannot identify or describe the vehicle, other than to say
that it was a bus. The plaintiff sues the Blue Bus Company and offers proof that the
Blue Bus Company operates eighty percent of the buses along the road where the
accident occurred, while the Red Bus .Company operates twenty percent of the
buses along the road. Surely, the plaintiff should be allowed to recover, having
shown more likely than not, based on probabilities, that a Blue Bus, rather than a
Red Bus, struck him. But courts generally say, "no." Indeed, most courts refuse to
even send the case to a jury based on statistical probabilities.' 41 Proof that more
SUVs than passenger cars were produced in a given year does not establish that an
undescribed vehicle made during the current year is an SUV rather than a passenger
car, nor does proof that most women die of causes other than breast cancer
establish that a particular woman did not die of cancer.
14 2
139. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (adopting market share
theory to apportion liability among pharmaceutical manufacturers of DES where plaintiffs could not
conclusively identify which manufacturer produced the drugs that harmed their fetuses); Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-37 (Cal. 1980) (rejecting the alternative liability and concerted action
theories).
140. See Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754, 754-55 (Mass. 1945); see Charles Nesson, The
Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357,
1359 (1985).
141. See Smith, 58 N.E.2d at 755.
142. See id.
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The significant distinction between Summers and the market share approach,
on the one hand, and Ybarra and the "blue bus" hypothetical, on the other, is that in
Summers and Hymowitz, everyone agreed that both hunters and all drug companies
were wrongdoers. By contrast, the Blue Bus Company might operate its entire fleet
with a near-perfect safety record, fully within the standard of care. Like most of the
operating room attendants in Ybarra, the Blue Bus Company might not have caused
the accident, much less any other accidents. Imposing liability on the Blue Bus
Company, based on the available facts, distorts the incentives for safety and seems
grossly unfair. If there is no negligence in the air, surely there is no liability in the
air, based solely on statistics. Like the Summers defendants, it might be good for
bus companies to get a message regarding safety, even if wrongdoing and injury do
not directly align. The public good seems well served by ensuring recovery to
injured plaintiffs as well as encouraging safer driving by all bus companies.
Assigning liability to the Blue Bus Company, based on statistical evidence alone,
however, would disproportionately burden larger companies and force them to
subsidize smaller companies like the Red Bus Company. Red Bus Company drivers
would not have an incentive to drive carefully, and accidents would increase. Social
utility, as a result, would decrease.
143
Another possible solution to the polluting factories or the blue bus
hypothetical would be to assign fault based not on market share, but in proportion
to fault. Suppose, for example, that the landowner could demonstrate that Factory
A produced forty percent of the sludge and that Factory B produced sixty percent.
Allowing the landowner to recover forty percent of his harm from Factory A and
sixty percent of his harm from Factory B would be entirely consistent with modem
comparative fault principles. Each factory would have the proper incentive for
safety, relative to the amount of harm caused, and the plaintiff would be made
whole. But suppose Factory B went out of business or was otherwise judgment-
proof The landowner could sue Factory A for forty percent of his damages but
would be left bearing the remaining sixty percent of his losses. Accordingly, from
the perspective of potential defendants, the proportional fault approach seems
consistent with utilitarian tort policies and the concern for "too much safety,"' 44 but
at the expense of the plaintiff's make-whole recovery.
Take another example: Suppose the plaintiff suffers from typhoid fever, one
possible cause of which is the city's contaminated drinking water. Myriad other
causes are also possible. The plaintiff can prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that there is a forty percent chance that the city's contaminated drinking water
caused his illness. Rather than allowing the plaintiff to recover one hundred percent
of his harm from the city based on weak statistical evidence, or denying recovery
143. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 604 (discussing the bus hypothetical); Nesson, supra note 140, at
1381-82 (describing Posner's arguments in support of the Smith v. Rapid Transit outcome on economic
efficiency grounds and suggesting alternative approach, requiring statistical plus additional evidence of
liability).
144. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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because the plaintiff failed to prove that the contaminated drinking water was the
"but for" cause of his illness, why not allow him to recover forty percent of his loss
from the city? 145 In a probabilistic sense, that result seems fair. The plaintiff would
not be left without a remedy, but would recover some portion of the harm
commensurate with the degree of probability that the defendant caused the harm.
On the other hand, the defendant, which caused some, but not all, of the harm,
would not get off scot-free, but instead would pay damages proportional to the
probability that the defendant may have caused the plaintiff's injury.
In "but for" terms, however, this result would allow the plaintiff to recover
despite failing to carry his burden of proof on an essential element of the claim:
"but for" causation. If, in fact, the city's contaminated drinking water did not cause
the disease, the plaintiff would recover a forty percent windfall, and the city
unfairly would be forced to pay forty percent of harm that it did not cause. But if
the city's contaminated drinking water was, in fact, responsible for the plaintiffs
illness, the plaintiff would be left bearing sixty percent of the loss while the city
would be allowed to impose sixty percent of the harm it caused on an innocent
victim. The city would receive only forty percent of the proper incentive for
improving the city's water quality and might calculate the cost-benefits of
continuing to inflict disease on its residents much longer than it would had it been
required to bear the full cost of the harm caused. Accordingly, using a probabilistic
approach to causation and proportional recovery in toxic torts and products liability
actions seems inconsistent with not only traditional tort policies but also public
health objectives.
C. Informal Regulation and Vioxx
Tort litigation offers an effective alternative to and several advantages over
government regulation of products and activities that endanger public health.
46
Private litigation is decentralized, stemming from individual complaints rather than
a broad policy agenda. Therefore, the process may identify risks and seek
corrective action more quickly than entrenched political or administrative
structures. Private litigants are not beholden to constituents, do not require
congressionally approved budget appropriations, and are not constrained by various
procedural strictures that can hamper lawmakers and regulators. The public enjoys
a largely "free" benefit, with attorneys and their clients fronting the costs of
bringing the actions and effecting policy change. In addition, to the extent that an
145. See Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 124 N.E. 137, 140 (N.Y. 1919) (noting that, based on similar
facts, the spirit of the 'but for' causation rule may be satisfied by evidence "from which it can be said
with reasonable certainty that the direct cause of the injury was the one for which the defendant was
liable").
146. See GOSTIN, supra note 25, at 265-66 (describing advantages and disadvantages of litigation as
informal regulation of public health).
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industry may have captured the agency charged with its regulation, tort litigation
may be more effective because it is decentralized and unaccountable.
147
On the other hand, regulating product safety, pollution standards, and other
public health objectives through private lawsuits is anti-democratic, in that it allows
individuals and their attorneys, rather than accountable political representatives, to
set the health policy agenda. In product liability cases, society may suffer by losing
a useful, beneficial product because the manufacturer faces staggering liability
from a few injured consumers. Also, the benefits may not disperse through society
but rather concentrate on a few litigants who gamer a windfall. Critics also suggest
that civil litigation is enormously expensive, with high administrative and
transaction costs, thereby depleting any benefits that society might derive from the
damages awarded. 148 Tort litigation, particularly over products such as junk food,
firearms, shallow swimming pools, and tobacco, may undermine some of the most
effective public health interventions, which call for consumers to avoid injury by
taking personal responsibility for improving health, including diet and exercise,
safety precautions, and due care. 149
The recent Vioxx litigation provides a good example of tort law and public
health goals in operation. Merck & Co. developed a popular prescription pain
medication that was especially effective for arthritis and other chronic conditions.
The drug had undergone the full Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") new drug
approval ("NDA") process, which requires a product to be proven "safe and
effective" for its intended use and ensures that identified side effects and adverse
reactions are listed on the product's label before it is marketed and sold. 5 ° After
several years on the market, some Vioxx patients experienced heart attacks and
147. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1965); MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
148. See Taylor & Thomas, supra note 4 (suggesting that costs to society are "enormous, an
estimated $200 billion a year, more than half of it for legal fees and costs that could be used to hire more
police or firefighters or teachers"). But see deMause, supra note 4 (suggesting that Taylor & Thomas's
figure "ignores the credit side of the ledger: the consumer savings brought by, for example, suits that
prompt improvements in product safety, or the reduced need to have the government cover care for
patients injured by medical misdeeds"); Mencimer, supra note 4 (noting that the $200 billion figure
includes administrative, overhead, and salary costs of insurance companies' CEOs). See also Galanter,
supra note 3, at 1096-97, 1140-41 (discrediting Vice President Dan Quayle's oft-quoted estimate that
the tort system costs the nation $300 billion annually).
149. See Geoffrey Rose, Sick Individuals and Sick Populations, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS,
supra note 25, at 58, 64 (describing the "prevention paradox," whereby preventative measures, such as
seatbelt-wearing and immunization, offer "enormous potential importance to the population as a whole"
yet "very little-particularly in the short term-to each individual" whereas "heroic" measures to save
individual lives, such as heart transplants, do little to improve the population's health); Shapo, supra
note 10, at 494-96 (describing defenses to products liability cases, including contributory negligence,
"open and obvious" dangers, and misuse).
150. 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (2006). See also Elizabeth A. Weeks, Is It Worth the Trouble? The
New Policy on Dissemination of Information on Off-Label Use Under the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 645, 652-58 (1999) (describing
NDA process).
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strokes. Plaintiffs alleged that Merck was aware of the increased risk and was
therefore liable for failure to warn. Merck continued to sell the blockbuster drug for
several months, even as more lawsuits were filed, but eventually voluntarily pulled
the product from the market in September 2004.5
As lawsuits mounted, Merck approached each claim separately, tailoring its
strategy to the facts of each case and particular characteristics of each plaintiff.
With over 27,000 cases pending, 152 there is ample opportunity for case-by-case
developments. For example, in August 2005, Merck lost the first case brought to
trial in Texas, involving a fifty-nine-year-old triathlete who took the medication for
several months. 53 The jury awarded $253.4 million in compensatory and punitive
damages. 154 Merck won the second case that made it to trial in Idaho in November
2005, involving an Idaho postal worker with a twenty-year history of health
problems, including high blood pressure, obesity, and known job-related stress,
who had taken Vioxx for only a few months.' 55 In the Idaho case, the jury refused
to find that Merck had not adequately warned the plaintiff and others about the
drug's risks. 5 6 With the score one-to-one, Merck was under no pressure to settle
other pending cases until a trend emerged, suggesting that the risks of liability were
greater than the expected benefits of continuing to fight "frivolous" lawsuits.
57
Many open questions remain, including the causal connection between the
plaintiffs' adverse health events and Vioxx, especially given the aforementioned
two plaintiffs' different underlying clinical conditions and periods of exposure to
the drug.
Several of the torts and public health themes described in this article played
out in the Vioxx litigation. Perhaps agency safety controls failed to identify the
serious health risk. Maybe the FDA turned a blind eye because of the
pharmaceutical industry's control of its regulators. Private litigation may effect
change more quickly than agency action, pressuring Merck to remove an
unreasonably dangerous product from the market. As the individual cases proceed
against Merck, the link, if any, between Vioxx and increased risk of heart attack
and strokes may become clear. The epidemiological evidence may be better
developed through private litigation than by the FDA's NDA process because
151. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local #68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc., 894 A.2d 1136,
1140 (2006).
152. See Marc Kaufman, Texas Jury Finds Merck Responsible in Vioxx Death, WASH. POST, Aug.
20, 2005, at AI.
153. Id.
154. Id. The punitive damages and pain and suffering awards were reduced according to Texas's
cap. Id. ("Texas state law caps punitive damages at twice the amount of economic damages").
155. See Marc Kaufman, Merck Wins Vioxx Lawsuit: Firm Not Held Responsible for Heart Attack,
WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2005, at DI.
156. Id.
157. See Merck Scores Win in Alabama Court Over Vioxx Drug, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2006, at A5
(announcing latest verdict and current "scorecard" of eight Merck wins to four Merck losses); see also
Merck Wins Suit in Alabama Over the Painkiller Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at C2.
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plaintiffs are more motivated and better funded than the agency to reveal the
underlying factual evidence. On the other hand, epidemiological evidence
developed for trial may reveal that plaintiffs' heart attack and stroke risk could be
better reduced by other health interventions, rather than by depriving the public of a
beneficial, popular pain medication.' 58 In addition, the high profile litigation may
capture the public's attention. Public attention can pressure the pharmaceutical
industry to improve safety, the FDA to implement more stringent controls,
159
individuals to improve health habits, and health care providers to improve
communications with patients.
As numerous Vioxx cases proceed to trial and settlement, it may become clear
whether the litigation is merely a "feeding frenzy" by greedy, ambulance-chasing
lawyers 160 or an effective approach to promoting public health and safety. The early
chapters of the story support the theme of this article, that tort law and public health
are not inherently dichotomous. Individuals may be awarded damages for harm
caused by a dangerous product, while the public at large, not just plaintiffs and
their lawyers, enjoys a public health windfall by means of an efficient and
responsive system of regulation by litigation.
CONCLUSION
Traditional tort law courses emphasize the goal of compensating individuals
for harms inflicted on them by other members of society. As between an injured
victim and an injurer, the task of tort law is to determine who should bear the loss.
Tort law protects individual autonomy by compensating victims for intrusions of
their bodily and personal integrity. The law also enforces standards of conduct.
Members of society who engage in activities that unreasonably endanger others'
safety are made to pay for the harms that they inflict. But the goal of tort law
extends beyond compensation. Optimal safety does not mean perfect safety but,
instead seeks to balance society's interests as a whole against the individual
victim's interest. The utilitarian calculus and communitarian tradition that underlies
much of tort law is central to public health law. Public health laws recognize that
individual interests sometimes must yield to the greater societal good.
Recent international incidents, epidemics, and natural disasters have brought
about a renaissance of public health law and policy. Law students preparing for a
range of practice settings, from public interest law to government work to corporate
158. See Vemick et al., supra note 106, at 93-94 (discussing increasing importance of epidemiology
in litigation and reciprocal relationship between law and epidemiology).
159. Increasingly vigorous FDA standards may limit the number of potentially useful
pharmaceutical products reaching the consumer market. In 2006, the FDA approved only seventeen new
drugs, the lowest number of approvals in the last fifty years. See Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report,
Prescription Drugs: FDA Approved 17 New Prescription Drugs in 2006, Lowest Approval Rate Since
New Drug Approvals Peaked at 53 a Decade Ago, Jan. 4, 2007,
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?DRID=41936.
160. See Crawford, supra note 4.
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representation, will benefit from gaining some basic introduction to public health
law themes. Although many law schools do not offer dedicated public health law
courses, those themes can be readily included in traditional law school courses,
including Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Health Law, Contracts, and
Torts. In this article, I have offered a non-exhaustive collection of examples from
traditional tort law cases, principles, and policies that highlight the perhaps
surprising but substantial overlap between torts and public health.

